After striking Iran, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of denuclearizing North Korea. But in making that declaration, Washington surely understood one thing very clearly: the attack on Iran has made the prospect of denuclearizing North Korea even more difficult — and far less realistic.
While the basic meaning of “denuclearization” is similar when applied to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, the real-world feasibility is vastly different. North Korea is far further along than Iran in its nuclear development. If the United States could have completely destroyed North Korea’s nuclear program with bombs and missiles — without putting nearly 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea at grave risk — Trump’s predecessors, and Trump himself during his first term, would likely have acted long ago. North Korea already has nuclear weapons; it is not merely at the threshold of acquiring them, as Iran is widely believed to be today.
The war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran will only make North Korea trust Washington even less, while strengthening Pyongyang’s determination to accelerate its nuclear and missile programs. U.S. and Israeli action against Iran reinforces the lesson North Korea appears to have drawn from the fate of Iraq and Libya: only by possessing nuclear weapons can it ensure that it will not become the target of a sudden American attack.
After the U.S. strike on Iran, North Korea is even less likely to return to negotiations with Washington over its nuclear and missile programs. Kim Jong Un now has even more reason to be cautious, and it will be much harder for him to restore the personal rapport he once appeared to have with Trump. Pyongyang can no longer afford anything less than vigilance, caution, and readiness, especially after seeing that Trump is willing to use America’s military power so aggressively to achieve his objectives.
From North Korea’s point of view, however, Trump cannot — and likely would not dare to — act against Pyongyang the way he acted against Iran. There are three reasons that effectively constrain him.
First, North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities remain a major unknown. The United States does not know with certainty how extensive or how powerful they truly are.
Second, Trump would need South Korea’s support and cooperation to launch any attack on North Korea, and that is close to impossible.
Third, Russia’s potential backing of North Korea is a factor Trump cannot ignore.
For that reason, whatever strategic effect Washington may have gained from attacking Iran could ultimately backfire when it comes to its goal of denuclearizing North Korea.