the uh Morgan Mcweeny, the chief of staff, rang Sir Phillip uh and said in terms stronger than those that I can use before the watershed. >> I think you should >> Well, I I’ll just say that it was just to prove it with a with um terms stronger than that. Does that accord with your impression? >> Just approve it.
>> Does it accord with your impression when you took over from Sir Phillip? I know this sounds formal and maybe even a bit unlikely, but thank you very much for the opportunity today to come and speak to you about these matters. As you say, it has been a difficult time leavenvened slightly by it being my birthday yesterday.
>> Um, all that >> uh so thank you for the opportunity to set things out. I won’t I won’t go on at length, but I think there are three important framing points I need to make. Firstly, as you say, uh when I walked into post as permanent under secretary on the 20th of January last year, I wasn’t walking into a vacuum.
Um I arrived to a situation in which um a due diligence report had been undertaken into Mandelen uh by the cabinet office uh assessing the reputational risks and his fitness for office. Um the prime minister had then presumably taken advice on his fitness for office. uh the name had been submitted to the king as minister’s re uh recommendation.
The prime minister had made an announcement uh that uh Mandlesson was his nominee without caveats. Uh the British government had sought a formal diplomatic process for a host government accepting a nominee from the US government and that had been obtained before I arrived in post. He’d been given access to the building.
he’d been given access to low classification it um from time to time for case specific issues he was being given access to higher classification briefing. So I’m afraid I walked into a situation in which um there was already a very very strong expectation and you would have seen the papers released already under the humble address uh that coming from number 10 that he needed to be in post and in America as quickly as humanly possible.
The very first formal communication of this to my predecessor from number 10 private office being that they wanted all this done at pace and Mandlesson in post before inauguration. So that’s the situation I faced. Um >> and sorry, so there is paperwork about that and that can presumably will be disclosed to parliament. >> It already has been chair.
That letter from number 10 private office is already in the disclosures made. >> Um there’s nothing improper about it, but that’s the con that’s the context I walked into. So, I’m afraid what that translated into um for my team in the foreign office and certainly the handover briefing I was getting as I arrived at post was what I felt was a generally dismissive attitude to his vetting clearance.
Um the focus was on getting Mandlesson out to Washington quickly. Despite this atmosphere uh an atmosphere of pressure, the department completed develop vetting to the normal high standard. because the vetting process is not there to determine fitness for office or reputational risk. It’s there to protect national security. >> Thank you, chair.
Um colleagues, I think I’m going to move on to other aspects, but I just want to probe a little bit further on one or two of the answers you’ve already given. Um you described to us the situation when you arrived in post the extent to which various uh steps had already been appointed due diligence the approval of the king the obtaining of Agrial.
Were you surprised that all of those had been completed without the vetting process having been done? Um, thank you, sir. So, John, I in in the in the narrow sense, I wasn’t surprised because I’ve been following the news. So, when I arrived in post, I knew perfectly well that the prime minister had made his appointment that it had been announced.
And of course, then in my handover with Philillip, um, he told me about Agramour and the other steps that you mention. As I look back, whilst the foreign office didn’t see it as I as I understand it at the time, I am also completely unsurprised by Simon Casease’s advice to the prime minister of November 2024 um that if he wished to make a political appointment, it would be the safest course to achieve security clearance before making the announcement.
And I think had I been imposed, Philip will speak for himself, maybe he did, but had I been imposed at around that time, that’s what I would have advised as well. So you think it should have been obtained before those steps were taken? >> I think as as others have said um publicly in the last few days um this is unusual because most people appointed to ambassadorial roles already hold clearance.
>> Um but that’s a very very sensible position to be in and it’s what I would have advised in this case too. >> Thank you. And you’ve also >> I should say I mean in the American context John as you may well be aware it’s it’s a particularly sensitive issue because the United States government is very hot on the clearances people hold and so it would have been a sensible precaution >> and actually had um approval not been granted and therefore uh the position had been revoked after Agri had already been obtained. Would that have damaged
our relations with the United States in your view? Um I think it certainly would have had I mean I think it would have damaged them. Yes, John. I mean the the um you know the the process of getting Agrial was um taken at quite some pace and was delivered I think still technically uh just by one working day by the Biden administration.
I think if um the uh the nomination had changed uh after that point, the incoming administration may well have commented on it publicly and it would yes have caused quite a quite an issue in the relationship. >> And the dismissive approach of number 10 uh which you describe in your letter, you say that that uh came from the fact all of these steps had already been taken.
Was there anything further uh which indicated to you that num 10 really didn’t regard this as anything more than a formality which had to be uh completed? >> Um to stay scrupulous John nothing I can bear personal witness to but certainly in my transition into the job I was briefed obviously about the uh the um debate there had been about whether to vet at all um and that all added to a picture.
>> Thank you. Uh can I also ask a little bit more about the meeting you had on the 29th of J of January uh which resulted in the decision to give uh DV clearance. Um you’ve said that you were briefed uh about the contents of the report by UKSV but you didn’t see it. Um now we understand and indeed the government has published the template decision making form in which there are three boxes at the end.
A green one uh an amber one which says approved but remain uh remain valid concerns and the red one the final one clearance denied or withdrawn. Now we are told that the tick was in the red box clearance denied or withdrawn. Now that doesn’t seem to me borderline. Were you aware that the tick was in the red box? >> Um, I have before the government chose to publish it.
I’ve never seen a form like that. Um, and so if I may make two points to John, I certainly do not recall the way in which the UKSV findings were presented to me as being that definitive. As I say, um, it was brief to me that they were leaning against, I think, is the phrase I remember, but Leaning leaning against is not the same as the decision.
We we are told that the decision the recommendation rather from UKSV was clear. The recommendation was denial. It wasn’t leaning. It was denial. >> Well, you asked me what I heard in that meeting and I’m I’m trying to remember to the best of my ability. Um the the other the other point which I think in the way you’ve asked the question you understand perfectly well but just in case that you know that that form is consumed differently in the foreign office and in half a dozen other departments than it is in other parts of
the system. Those are recommendations and not decisions. And so what my team will have done, I’m sure, is break that down, go through the specific issues that have led UKV to their concern and then make an assessment as to whether they can be managed. And that’s what came to me. >> Your team did that. Um the meeting you had was only with the director of security.
So it would have been his officials who have broken it down and he would have reported to you the outcome of that process. >> Right. And a note was then circulated afterwards saying what the decision was. Did that note simply say it has been decided that Lord Bandlesson is to be granted clearance or did it say despite the recommendation of UK SV it has been decided? >> Um I think that that minute is um not a minute I can properly discuss.
Sir John, I’m it’s no longer sadly my document. Um, and as I said in answer to the chair’s questions earlier, it’s it’s a it’s a minute that certainly uh would give you the public, but also our adversaries quite a strong sense of how we tried to manage that. >> Can I just because there’s there’s a little bit of mounting confusion I think on the committee and if it’s not just on the committee, it might be with the public as well.
Are you are you saying that UKSV didn’t recommend that that DV be denied? I’ve put in too many negatives there. Are you saying Are you saying that that UKSV um didn’t Yeah. didn’t recommend that DV be denied? Are you saying that? >> No, I’m I’m trying to tell the committee what I was briefed in that meeting on >> saying borderline.
>> I’m I was told it was a borderline case and that they lent against. >> Borderline and lent against. And that’s different, is it, to recommend that DV be denied? I I can only tell you the words. I was I said you you were not aware that this box had a tick in it. The red box saying clearance denied. >> I until the government published it.
I’ve never seen a sheet like that. So John, >> but even if you hadn’t seen the sheet, you didn’t know you didn’t know that the clear recommendation final decision of UKSV was clearance denied. I I was told that it was a borderline case and that UKSV were leaning against granting clearance. >> This is the most sensitive diplomatic appointment in British government.
We have seen a form where it both boxes were for denied. Did you not think to check if there is a precedent where someone’s been denied to then inform the foreign secretary or the prime minister? I’m sorry to harp on. Peter Manson was not denied vetting. >> The recommendation >> the UKSV report in the case of the foreign office and half a dozen other departments makes a recommendation on the basis of findings that’s then assessed and a decision is made by the department by a capable, experienced and expert team. So, I didn’t think I’d
better go and find out whether people who’ve had some particular risks highlighted in a UKSV report have then had that information shared with the prime minister or with any other minister because to do so would immediately have opened up the box of the vetting system which I I hold to to this hour is an important part of our national defenses.
Let me pivot to a slightly different way because the the form that we’ve seen that you’re saying we’ve you’ve not previously seen both the boxes were read where it’s high concern and clearance denied or withdrawn but you’re saying that’s not a failure of vetting. So se S se you know related but separate once the disclosure of the uh once Bloomberg had some emails disclosed to them and the prime minister was going forward at prime minister’s questions did you not think it was worth revisiting the UK SV um document or or having those
discussions andor did you ever have any discussions about withdrawing security clearance now that new information has come to Um so on the second part of your question, it it didn’t arise honestly because with Mandlesson having been uh sacked with immediate effect from his post in Washington, um his access to uh classified information was withdrawn immediately.
And so uh although as you will know from the public documents, it took some days or even a couple of weeks for him to leave the government’s payroll, um the national security risk he could in theory have posed was uh was eliminated immediately. the the the first part of your question again. Sorry. >> Did once the Bloomberg that cache of emails that Bloomberg had came to light and you knew the and this is questions on on judgment and I think I asked you this last time on the transcript and so Chris Warmwood actually told us in answer to some of these questions that
the due diligence has two parts. There’s identification of information and then there’s judgment. You knew that the prime minister was set to stand at the dispatch box and vouch for one of your members of staff. You were rightly concerned with your staff’s reputation. But my question to you at that time was, were you not worried about the prime minister being misled? Were you not worried about him misleading the house given that you had not told him the full picture? >> Yeah.
I look I I hope I’ve explained I I don’t think that it would have been proper for me to expose what you call the full picture to the prime minister. I don’t think I had an obligation to to do that. I believe very strongly I had an obligation not to do that. What I do remember distinctly um is in the immediate aftermath of his sacking as the prime minister’s nominee to Washington, we I did consider um the asking for the UKSV underlying documentation.
Um and that was discussed on my behalf with the cabinet office who initially uh said that I needed a national security justification for reading that documentation and that’s completely consistent with my understanding of the system. I >> I’m sorry to sound like a broken record. Is there a record of this >> of this conversation? >> I you I’m afraid you will have to ask the department.
The the the point that I’m trying to make is that then >> is there a record of you asking you would have you would have thought about this and thought I think I should look into this. >> I think I’m going to make this request and these are the reasons why I’m going to make this request. Did you make a note of that? >> I personally I don’t remember doing so.
I’m sure there will be evidence that you could take that will that will stand that up. Um the thing the thing I’m trying to get to and I’m you know is that actually the cabinet’s offices response made sense to me. This is a this is a hermetically sealed box and just because it’s convenient to you as permanent under secretary or uh you know reputationally timely to review this documentation that doesn’t mean you should do so.
And so I think they changed their view later and I and I also respect the reasons they might have changed their view. There was a lot of dialogue between the foreign office and the cabinet office as to who precisely owned this risk. But what I’m saying to you is yes, it did cross my mind but I wasn’t surprised at the immediate reaction.
>> Thank you chair and thank you sir Ollie. I’ve got questions about three different aspects of the the process. Um going back to the very beginning before you started there were conversations between Peter Mandlesson and uh number 10. So yesterday the prime minister said it was clear to me that Peter Mandlesson’s answers to my staff in the due diligence exercise before you started uh were not truthful and I sacked him.
That sounds like it’s Morgan Mweeny. So, but when you came into the office, did you have notes of any interview that Morgan Mweeny had held with Peter Mandlesson as a part of the due diligence or even the pre-due diligence when talking about appointing him? Did you see notes of this interview that may have given you concerns um that could then have influenced how you saw the vetting process continue? >> No, didn’t know about any of those.
I I knew that there had been um an appointment process of sorts um and uh that um number 10 had operated that with the cabinet office, but I to be honest I think I first heard the words due diligence report um after he was withdrawn as ambassador. >> Uh thank you. And then the second one is about the the meeting that you held on the 29th of January about the the vetting.
Did you hold that meeting because it was flagged that Peter Malinson hadn’t passed? If it was a clear pass, a green tick box in the form you didn’t see, would you have even held that meeting or did you hold the meeting because it was an ambassadorial appointment to Washington and it was Peter Mandlesen? Um I was asked for that meeting um because I think it was a borderline case and a particularly prominent and significant borderline case on which perfectly properly very sensibly um the director felt he wanted to check his reasoning and make sure that I was
comfortable with it. And is there a note to that effect >> that the request was that the decision was made that you should have a meeting because of these issues were going to come up? >> Not to my knowledge. The um it was you know this was director ESND was one of the most important figures in the way I was learning how to run the department.
Um, I’d spent a lot of time with Ian already because of the heavy responsibilities that I was learning that I held as uh as accountable overall for security. So Ian was in and out of my private office regularly and I was pleased about that. He I think said to my private office, I need 10 minutes with Ollie tomorrow, the day after in order to take him through a particular case.
a particular case, not the particular case that you’ve been rung up every day by number 10 to ask about. >> This is secondhand. I’m I’m trying to help you by guessing what the conversation might have been. >> All right. Okay. It’s unfortunate because if there had been a note made of the decision that that the the the the bill, you know, the the the the putting into the diary of a meeting that was going to take place for particular purposes um and with particular reasons.
If there had been a note of that, then we wouldn’t need to guess at the reasons for it and Flur would be able to get fuller answers to the questions that she’s asking. >> Although I should say again, apologies chair, none of the issues that underly the conversation we’ve been having this morning could have been committed to our IT system.
So I and for all I know um they you know my diary will say that there is an appointment with director ESND but the office were not allowed it would have been a serious breach for them to try and explain in that appointment in my calendar what the underlying questions were. You can make notes to your private office, can’t you, about what you’re doing and why.
>> The what was done, I think entirely appropriately, was that the decision was recorded the next day.